Still, Moscow had no reason to anticipate that
the new administration would take action against its interests. All of
that changed last week.
Moscow has enjoyed policy success and enhanced
prestige since its September 2015 decision to increase its military
operation in Syria. At that point, the Bashar Assad regime was on the
ropes; Moscow's intervention first stabilized Assad's position; then
enabled him to reconquer territory in the West, especially Aleppo; and
prompted the flow of over 1 million refugees that produced serious
stains in the European Union.
But Moscow could achieve these results because
it was the only major outside power engaged militarily in Syria. The
U.S. action last week could put all this at risk.
Trump decided to order that strike because
Assad's military used chemical weapons against civilians. But if the
U.S. were to decide that Assad's use of barrel bombs or saturation
bombing against civilians was also unacceptable, Moscow would be able to
do little. American conventional forces easily outclass Russia's. And
without air superiority, the Assad regime's position would start to
deteriorate, as would Russian prestige in the Middle East. Besides
shrill condemnation, Moscow's reaction to last week's missile strike was
to suspend the agreement on deconflicting U.S. and Russian forces in
Syria; but while that agreement serves American interests, it is even
more important to Moscow, again because of American conventional
superiority.
So for Moscow, the first order of business with
Tillerson is Syria. The Kremlin has noted that since the April 8 attack,
senior U.S. officials have said different things about regime change.
Both national security adviser H.R. McMaster and United Nations
Ambassador Nikki Haley have suggested publicly that Assad must go –
although without saying that this would be the result of American
action. After first speaking in a similar fashion, Tillerson backed away
and said that our first priority is defeating the Islamic State group,
and then we would look at the issue of stabilizing Syria.
Moscow would very much like to hear from the
secretary that regime change is not U.S. policy and that the U.S. action
was directed only against Assad's use of chemical weapons. Moscow wants
to maintain its largely free hand in Syria.
As the head of Exxon Mobil, Tillerson certainly
learned the advantage of leverage in negotiations. The president's Syria
strike has given Washington leverage. Tillerson is not likely to make
the rookie mistake of giving that up by reassuring Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov that the American action was only directed against
chemical weapons. He should keep the Kremlin and the Assad regime on
tenterhooks by talking about the inadmissibility of military action
against civilians.
Such a strong, if still ambiguous, position on
Syria would set the stage for the second large issue on Tillerson's
agenda: Ukraine. Some good advance work for the Tillerson visit to
Moscow was done by Vice President Mike Pence at the Munich Security
Conference in February, when he told Ukrainian President Petro
Poroshenko that there would be no easing of sanctions on Moscow until it
fulfills all of its commitments under the Minsk Agreements, and that
the U.S. supported fully the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
Ukraine.
Tillerson should use this visit to underscore
that Moscow's aggression in Ukraine comes at a high price: the
maintenance of sanctions, which cost Russia 1-1.5 percent of GDP in
2015, and possible additional military support for Ukraine. The Trump
administration has endorsed the good decisions taken at the NATO Summit
in Warsaw last summer to deploy heavily armed battalions to the three
Baltic States, Poland and Romania to deter Moscow. The secretary should
let the Kremlin understand that supporting Ukraine is a form of forward
defense for NATO.
At the same time, he should underscore our
willingness to help the Kremlin find a face-saving way to remove its
soldiers and heavy weapons from the Donbass while restoring Ukrainian
sovereignty and control of its border with Russia.
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Tillerson also needs to raise two other
difficult issues. The first is Moscow's violation of the Intermediate
Nuclear Forces Treaty, which forbids the production and deployment of
intermediate range nuclear missiles. In violation of the treaty, Moscow
tested intermediate range cruise missiles in 2014, and earlier this year
deployed them. The secretary needs to make clear that if Moscow does
not reverse this violation, the U.S. will consider all options.
The second is Moscow's reckless practice of
flying its warplanes dangerously close to U.S. and NATO ships and
planes. The most recent incident occurred February in the Black Sea. At
the high speeds of Russian fighters, such close passes can lead to
tragic incidents and even an armed confrontation. The secretary should
suggest that the recently reopened NATO-Russia military channel address
these issues.
The most important issues on the docket for this
visit are all difficult ones. Tillerson's readiness to raise them,
particularly Syria, may explain why Dimitry Peshkov, Russian President
Vladimir Putin's spokesman, has said that his boss may not be available
to see his old pal, the new secretary of state.
But these issues address the policies
threatening Western interests that the Kremlin has been pursuing in the
recent past. Timid Western leadership has not discouraged Putin from
aggression in Ukraine, a savage bombing campaign in Syria against the
moderate opposition and Syrian civilians, and provocations against NATO.
Perhaps the strength the new U.S. president exhibited in Syria starts
the process of reining in a rogue Kremlin.
If so, that might prepare the way for fruitful
talks on other issues – drug trafficking, even terrorism – where our
interests could coincide. But that only serves American interests and
that is only possible when the Kremlin recognizes that aggression and
adventurism will only lead to failure.
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